三位IMF經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家周四發(fā)文呼吁，各國政府需要重新考慮財政緊縮和對外資開放的價值。文章一出，立即引發(fā)軒然大波。因為IMF正是當(dāng)年力推這些政策的重要參與機(jī)構(gòu)之一。

IMF總裁拉加德

在IMF最新一期刊物《FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT》上發(fā)表的題為《新自由主義：已超賣》（Neoliberalism: Oversold ？）的論文中，IMF研究部副主任Jonathan D. Ostry、宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展部主管Prakash Loungani等三位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對“新自由主義”提出了批評。

“新自由主義”的政策理念，其以1989年誕生的“華盛頓共識”為政策宣言。后者是一整套針對當(dāng)時陷入危機(jī)的拉美國家和東歐轉(zhuǎn)軌國家的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)理論，提出者是美國，參與者為IMF、世界銀行、美洲開發(fā)銀行和美國財政部的研究人員。

“華盛頓共識”主要包括壓縮財政赤字、重視基建、降低邊際稅率、實施利率市場化、采用具有競爭力的匯率制度、實施貿(mào)易自由化、放松對外資的限制、實施國有企業(yè)私有化等十大方面。

這種政策在近幾年的希臘危機(jī)期間被IMF通過借錢而強(qiáng)加給希臘推行。如今，它是美國總統(tǒng)競選中的熱門話題之一。

新自由主義的精神領(lǐng)袖、著名經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家弗里德里?！す?/span>

上述三位IMF經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對新自由主義理論的批評之處主要集中在兩點：一是財政緊縮政策，二是不同國家之間的資本自由流動。

他們援引全球數(shù)據(jù)稱，上述兩個關(guān)鍵政策不僅擴(kuò)大了社會不平等，還危害了經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)增長，也令資本市場不穩(wěn)定。

具體細(xì)節(jié)方面，三位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家稱，財政緊縮方面，他們認(rèn)同部分歐洲國家由于無法不斷借貸度日，在別無選擇的情況下只能緊縮開支，但不應(yīng)該要求所有國家都一刀切，統(tǒng)統(tǒng)采取財政緊縮措施。對于有良好記錄的國家來說，減少債務(wù)的好處其實很小，但是加稅及削減開支的代價卻很大。

文章還稱，對于一個國家來說，債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)是已經(jīng)發(fā)生且無法恢復(fù)的沉沒成本。有充足的財政空間的政府應(yīng)當(dāng)選擇保持一定的債務(wù)水平以推動經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，而不是強(qiáng)行增加盈余來減少債務(wù)。

他們還表示，新自由主義提倡的金融貿(mào)易自由化當(dāng)中，資本流入的確有助于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，比如外商直接投資。但證券投資及債務(wù)類資金流入?yún)s對一個國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展沒有幫助。

同時，開放資本賬戶等金融市場化手段則會導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)波動加劇，令金融危機(jī)更加頻繁。也有研究顯示這與社會不平等有關(guān)。有足夠證據(jù)顯示，開放資本流動需要付出龐大代價。

文章還強(qiáng)調(diào)，無論是開放資本流動或是推動緊縮政策，都會導(dǎo)致社會收入不均問題加劇，從而阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。

事實上，新自由主義在過去多年一直引發(fā)學(xué)界和政界爭議，IMF也曾對此進(jìn)行反思。比如，該機(jī)構(gòu)前首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家Olivier Blanchard早在2010年已指出，很多發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體都不應(yīng)強(qiáng)推緊縮，而是要作中期的財政整頓。

附：IMF經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家原文《新自由主義已然江郎才盡？》（翻譯來自微信公眾號“女神讀書會”）

Neoliberalism: Oversold?

新自由主義已然江郎才盡？

Instead of delivering growth, some neoliberal policies have increasedinequality, in turn jeopardizing durable expansion

部分新自由主義的政策并沒有給經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來增長，反而加劇了不公平，進(jìn)而危及了經(jīng)濟(jì)體量的持久擴(kuò)大。

Milton Friedman in 1982 hailed Chile as an “economic miracle.” Nearly adecade earlier, Chile had turned to policies that have since been widelyemulated across the globe. The neoliberal agenda—a label used more by critics than by the architects of the policies—rests on two main planks. The first is increased competition—achieved through deregulation and the opening up of domesticmarkets, including financial markets, to foreign competition. The second is asmaller role for the state, achieved through privatization and limits on theability of governments to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt.

1982年彌爾頓·弗里德曼盛贊智利是一個“經(jīng)濟(jì)奇跡”。將近十年前，智利已轉(zhuǎn)向那些被世界各地廣泛效仿的政策?！靶伦杂芍髁x議程”這一標(biāo)簽主要被批評者拿來使用，而非那些政策締造者們，它主要基于兩條總綱。第一點是加劇競爭，這可以通過放松管制和開放國內(nèi)市場迎接外資競爭，包括開放金融市場來實現(xiàn)。第二點是弱化國家的作用，通過私有化和限制各國政府的運行財政赤字和債務(wù)積累的能力來實現(xiàn)。

There has beena strong and widespread global trend toward neoliberalism since the 1980s,according to a composite index that measures the extent to which countriesintroduced competition in various spheres of economic activity to fostereconomic growth. As shown in the left panel of Chart 1, Chile’s push started a decade or so earlier than 1982, with subsequent policy changes bringing it ever closer to theUnited States. Other countries have also steadily implemented neoliberalpolicies (see Chart 1, right panel

自20世紀(jì)80年代以來，全球范圍內(nèi)出現(xiàn)了一個強(qiáng)大的新自由主義趨勢，這是一個綜合指數(shù)以后得出的結(jié)論，該指數(shù)用于測量各個國家為了促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的在多個領(lǐng)域的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動中的程度。如圖1的左圖中所示，早在1982年之前，智利推行新自由主義已有10年左右了。隨后的政策變化使其比以往任何時候都要接近于美國。其他國家也穩(wěn)步實施新自由主義政策（見下圖）。

There is much to cheer in the neoliberal agenda. The expansion ofglobal trade has rescued millions from abject poverty. Foreign directinvestment has often been a way to transfer technology and know-how todeveloping economies. Privatization of state-owned enterprises has in manyinstances led to more efficient provision of services and lowered the fiscalburden on governments.

“新自由主義議程”得到了許多呼聲。全球貿(mào)易的擴(kuò)張已經(jīng)從赤貧中救出了數(shù)百萬人。外國直接投資也成了將科技和知識技能轉(zhuǎn)移到發(fā)展中國家經(jīng)濟(jì)體的一種常見方式。許多時候，國有企業(yè)的私有化使得服務(wù)的供應(yīng)更高效，并降低各國政府財政負(fù)擔(dān)。

However, there are aspects of the neoliberal agenda that have notdelivered as expected. Our assessment of the agenda is confined to the effectsof two policies: removing restrictions on the movement of capital across acountry’s borders (so-calledcapital account liberalization); and fiscal consolidation, sometimes called “austerity,” which isshorthand for policies to reduce fiscal deficits and debt levels. An assessmentof these specific policies (rather than the broad neoliberal agenda)reaches three disquieting conclusions:

?The benefits in terms of increased growth seemfairly difficult to establish when looking at a broad group of countries.-

?The costs in terms of increased inequality areprominent. Such costs epitomize the trade-off between the growth and equityeffects of some aspects of the neoliberal agenda.-

?Increased inequality in turn hurts the level and sustainability ofgrowth. Even if growth is the sole or main purpose of the neoliberal agenda,advocates of that agenda still need to pay attention to the distributionaleffects.

不過在一些方面，“新自由主義議程”并沒有如期實現(xiàn)。我們對此“議程”的評估僅限于兩項政策的效果：一、消除資本在國家間的流動限制（所謂的資本賬戶自由化）。二、財政整合，有時也被稱為“緊縮”，這是減少財政赤字和債務(wù)水平的政策的簡稱。對于這些具體政策（而不是廣義的“新自由主義議程”）的評估有三點令人不安的結(jié)論：

?在一個更加廣泛的、多國團(tuán)體的視域下來看（譯者按：如歐盟），利益增長似乎很難實現(xiàn)。

?不公平的加劇非常顯著。這樣的代價體現(xiàn)了新自由主義議程的某些方面對經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和公平效益之間的權(quán)衡。

?不平等的加劇進(jìn)而損害了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的水平和可持續(xù)性。即使增長是新自由主義議程的唯一或主要目的，該議程的倡導(dǎo)者還需要注意的分配的結(jié)果。

Open and shut?

As Maurice Obstfeld (1998) has noted, “economic theory leaves no doubt about the potential advantages” of capital account liberalization, which is also sometimes calledfinancial openness. It can allow the international capital market to channelworld savings to their most productive uses across the globe. Developingeconomies with little capital can borrow to finance investment, therebypromoting their economic growth without requiring sharp increases in their ownsaving. But Obstfeld also pointed to the “genuine hazards” of openness toforeign financial flows and concluded that “this duality of benefits and risks is inescapable in the real world.”

開放還是關(guān)閉？

正如莫里斯·奧布斯特菲爾德（1998年）所指出的，“經(jīng)濟(jì)理論絕不懷疑潛在優(yōu)勢”這是對資本賬戶自由化來說的，它有時也被稱為金融開放。它可以讓國際資本市場打開渠道，從而使世界上的儲蓄最大程度上被利用。發(fā)展中國家資本有限，可以借貸進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)投資，促進(jìn)其經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，而不需要使自己的儲蓄急劇增加。但奧布斯特菲爾德還指出了開放外國資本流動的“真正風(fēng)險”，并認(rèn)為“這種收益和風(fēng)險并存的二元性在現(xiàn)實世界中是無法避免的?！?

This indeed turns out to be the case. The link between financialopenness and economic growth is complex. Some capital inflows, such as foreigndirect investment—which may include atransfer of technology or human capital—do seem to boost long-term growth. But the impact of other flows—such as portfolio investment and banking and especially hot, orspeculative, debt inflows—seem neither toboost growth nor allow the country to better share risks with its tradingpartners (Dell’Ariccia and others,2008; Ostry, Prati, and Spilimbergo, 2009). This suggests that the growth andrisk-sharing benefits of capital flows depend on which type of flow is beingconsidered; it may also depend on the nature of supporting institutions andpolicies.-

情況也的確如此。資本開放與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長之間的關(guān)系非常復(fù)雜。一些資本流入，如外商直接投資，其中可能包括科技或人力資本的轉(zhuǎn)移，似乎能刺激長期的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。但其他方面資本的流入，如尤為火爆的證券投資和銀行投資，或投機(jī)性的債務(wù)流入，似乎既不刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，也無法使該國與貿(mào)易伙伴更好地共擔(dān)風(fēng)險（Dell'Ariccia等人，2008年;Ostry，Prati和的Spilimbergo，2009）。這表明，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和資本流動帶來的風(fēng)險共擔(dān)型的利益取決于流動類型，也可能取決于配套制度和政策的性質(zhì)。

Although growth benefits are uncertain, costs in terms of increasedeconomic volatility and crisis frequency seem more evident. Since 1980, therehave been about 150 episodes of surges in capital inflows in more than 50emerging market economies; as shown in the left panel of Chart 2, about 20percent of the time, these episodes end in a financial crisis, and many ofthese crises are associated with large output declines (Ghosh, Ostry, andQureshi, 2016).

盡管在獲益方面不是很確定，但經(jīng)濟(jì)動蕩和危機(jī)頻率加劇這兩個方面倒是變得更加明顯。自1980年以來，在50多個新興市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體中。已經(jīng)有大約150次危機(jī)事件由資本流入導(dǎo)致。如圖2的左圖中所示，這段時間大約有20％的事件以金融危機(jī)告終，許多這些危機(jī)都與產(chǎn)出大量下降有關(guān)（戈什，奧斯特里，和庫雷希，2016年）。

The pervasiveness of booms and busts gives credence to the claim byHarvard economist Dani Rodrik that these “are hardly a sideshow or a minor blemish in international capitalflows; they are the main story.” While thereare many drivers, increased capital account openness consistently figures as arisk factor in these cycles. In addition to raising the odds of a crash,financial openness has distributional effects, appreciably raising inequality(see Furceri and Loungani, 2015, for a discussion of the channels through whichthis operates). Moreover, the effects of openness on inequality are much higherwhen a crash ensues (Chart 2, right panel).

大面積的繁榮與大面積的蕭條（如此大起大落）讓哈佛大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家，丹尼·羅德里克得以斷言，這些事件“不是在國際資本流動中的一個插曲或是小瑕疵，它們正是主要情節(jié)?！庇辛巳绱硕嘞壤?，堅持加大資本賬戶開放被證明在這個循環(huán)中是一個風(fēng)險因素。除了提高崩潰的幾率，資本開放還具有分配效應(yīng)，即明顯加劇不公平（見Furceri和Loungani，2015年，對于此類運作渠道的討論）。此外，當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰來臨，開放帶來的不公平效應(yīng)將會更大。（見下圖）。

The mounting evidence on the high cost-to-benefitratio of capital account openness, particularly with respect toshort-term flows, led the IMF’s former FirstDeputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, now the vice chair of the U.S.Federal Reserve Board, to exclaim recently: “What useful purpose is served by short-term international capitalflows?” Among policymakerstoday, there is increased acceptance of controls to limit short-term debt flowsthat are viewed as likely to lead to—or compound—a financialcrisis. While not the only tool available—exchange rate and financial policies can also help—capital controls are a viable, and sometimes the only, option whenthe source of an unsustainable credit boom is direct borrowing from abroad(Ostry and others, 2012).-

資本賬戶開放，特別是對于短期流動來說，“成本-效益”的轉(zhuǎn)化率很高，越來越多的證據(jù)表明了這一點。這讓國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）的前第一副理事，現(xiàn)美聯(lián)儲委員會的副主席，斯坦利·費希爾，最近驚呼：“短期國際資本流動有何益處？”今天，政策制定者們，更加傾向控制政策，以限制短期債務(wù)流動，因為它往往直接導(dǎo)致或者催化經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)。雖然資本控制不是僅有的有效手段，匯率和財政政策也會起作用，但它是非?？孔V的，甚至當(dāng)一股當(dāng)不可持續(xù)的信貸繁榮的來源是直接借用海外資本時，它是唯一的手段。（奧斯特里等，2012）

Size of the state

Curbing the size of the state is another aspect of the neoliberalagenda. Privatization of some government functions is one way to achieve this.Another is to constrain government spending through limits on the size offiscal deficits and on the ability of governments to accumulate debt. Theeconomic history of recent decades offers many examples of such curbs, such asthe limit of 60 percent of GDP set for countries to join the euro area (one ofthe so-called Maastricht criteria).

政府的規(guī)模

遏制政府的大小是新自由主義議程的另一個方面。一些政府職能私有化是實現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)的途徑之一。另一種是通過限制財政赤字的規(guī)模和政府債務(wù)累積的能力來控制政府開支。近幾十年來的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展史提供了很多此類限制的例子，比如加入歐元區(qū)國家的，赤字不得超過GDP的60%的限定（所謂的馬斯特里赫特標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之一）。

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論很少提供對最佳公共債務(wù)目標(biāo)的指導(dǎo)。一些理論表明需要更高的債務(wù)（因為稅收具有扭曲性），而另一些則認(rèn)為是更低的甚至是負(fù)的水平（因為應(yīng)對不利沖擊需要預(yù)防性儲蓄）。在一些財政政策的建議中，IMF主要關(guān)注各國政府減少赤字和債務(wù)水平的步伐，這是全球金融危機(jī)背景下，由發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的債務(wù)積累所引起的：步伐太慢會使市場失去勇氣;太快則會破壞復(fù)蘇。但I(xiàn)MF也同意，中期就償還部分債務(wù)，降低一些負(fù)債率，尤其是一些有廣泛的發(fā)達(dá)國家和新興國家參與債務(wù)里，主要是作為對未來沖擊的保險。

But is there really a defensible case for countries like Germany,the United Kingdom, or the United States to pay down the public debt? Twoarguments are usually made in support of paying down the debt in countries withample fiscal space—that is, incountries where there is little real prospect of a fiscal crisis. The first isthat, although large adverse shocks such as the Great Depression of the 1930sor the global financial crisis of the past decade occur rarely, when they do,it is helpful to have used the quiet times to pay down the debt. The secondargument rests on the notion that high debt is bad for growth—and, therefore, to lay a firm foundation for growth, paying down thedebt is essential.-

但其他國家真的能像德國，英國，或美國一樣能守住危機(jī)，來償還公共債務(wù)？通常有兩個理由來支持國家是否有擁有償還債務(wù)的充足財政空間，這意味著那些國家?guī)缀醪粫霈F(xiàn)財政危機(jī)。第一點，雖然像20世紀(jì)30年代的大蕭條或過去十年的全球性金融危機(jī)那樣的巨大負(fù)面沖擊很少發(fā)生，但在平穩(wěn)時期償還債務(wù)是有所助益的。第二個理由是建立在“高負(fù)債不利于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展”這一概念之上的，因此，償還債務(wù)能為發(fā)展打下一個堅實的基礎(chǔ)。

It is surely the case that many countries (such as those in southernEurope) have little choice but to engage in fiscal consolidation, becausemarkets will not allow them to continue borrowing. But the need forconsolidation in some countries does not mean all countries—at least in this case, caution about “one size fits all” seemscompletely warranted. Markets generally attach very low probabilities of a debtcrisis to countries that have a strong record of being fiscally responsible(Mendoza and Ostry, 2007). Such a track record gives them latitude to decidenot to raise taxes or cut productive spending when the debt level is high(Ostry and others, 2010; Ghosh and others, 2013). And for countries with astrong track record, the benefit of debt reduction, in terms of insuranceagainst a future fiscal crisis, turns out to be remarkably small, even at veryhigh levels of debt to GDP. For example, moving from a debt ratio of 120percent of GDP to 100 percent of GDP over a few years buys the country verylittle in terms of reduced crisis risk (Baldacci and others, 2011).

無疑許多國家（如那些在歐洲南部的國家）別無他法，只能選擇財政整合。因為市場不會允許他們繼續(xù)借貸。但一些國家需要整合并不意味著所有國家需要——至少在這種情況下，關(guān)于“一刀切”警告似乎是必要的。市場通常認(rèn)為那些有較好財政責(zé)任記錄的國家，債務(wù)危機(jī)的可能性會低一些（門多薩和奧斯特里，2007）。這樣的跟蹤紀(jì)錄給了他們一個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，當(dāng)這些國家債務(wù)水平較高時，決定不提高稅收或削減生產(chǎn)開支。（奧斯特里等，2010; Ghosh等，2013年）。而對于具有較強(qiáng)的跟蹤記錄的國家，減債是應(yīng)對未來財政危機(jī)的保險，其好處真可謂是非常小，即使債務(wù)占GDP比重很高。例如，從債務(wù)比率占GDP的120%從幾年內(nèi)變到100％，這對國家降低危機(jī)風(fēng)險并沒有多大作用。（巴達(dá)西等，2011年）

But even if the insurance benefit is small, it may still be worthincurring if the cost is sufficiently low. It turns out, however, that the costcould be large—much larger than thebenefit. The reason is that, to get to a lower debt level, taxes that distorteconomic behavior need to be raised temporarily or productive spending needs tobe cut—or both. The costs of the tax increases or expenditure cuts requiredto bring down the debt may be much larger than the reduced crisis riskengendered by the lower debt(Ostry,Ghosh, and Espinoza, 2015). This is not to deny that high debt is bad forgrowth and welfare. It is. But the key point is that the welfare cost from thehigher debt (the so-called burden of the debt) is one that has already beenincurred and cannot be recovered; it is a sunk cost. Faced with a choicebetween living with the higher debt—allowing the debt ratio to decline organically through growth—or deliberately running budgetary surpluses to reduce the debt,governments with ample fiscal space will do better by living with the debt.-

但是，即使保險金很少，如果成本足夠低，它可能仍然是值得承擔(dān)。然而，事實證明，這種成本比獲益大得多。其原因在于，要獲得較低的債務(wù)水平，稅（即扭曲經(jīng)濟(jì)行為）需要暫時升高或生產(chǎn)性開支需要被削減，甚至兩者同時進(jìn)行。而加稅或削減開支來被用來降低債務(wù)，但其費用可能比用低債務(wù)降低的危機(jī)風(fēng)險大得多（奧斯特里，戈什和埃斯皮諾薩，2015）。這并不是否認(rèn)高負(fù)債不利于增長和福利。高負(fù)債確實不好。但關(guān)鍵是，高債務(wù)下的福利成本（所謂的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)）是已經(jīng)發(fā)生且無法收回的成本之一，它是一種沉沒成本。與高額債務(wù)共存，使債務(wù)比率在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長中有機(jī)下降，或者刻意以預(yù)算盈余來減少債務(wù)，面對這兩種選擇時，只有與債務(wù)共存，擁有充足的財政空間的政府才能有更好的表現(xiàn)。

Austerity policies not only generate substantial welfare costs dueto supply-side channels, they also hurt demand—and thus worsen employment and unemployment. The notion that fiscalconsolidations can be expansionary (that is, raise output and employment), inpart by raising private sector confidence and investment, has been championedby, among others, Harvard economist Alberto Alesina in the academic world andby former European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet in the policyarena.    However, in practice, episodesof fiscal consolidation have been followed, on average, by drops rather than byexpansions in output. On average, a consolidation of 1 percent of GDP increasesthe long-term unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage point and raises by 1.5percent within five years the Gini measure of income inequality (Ball andothers, 2013).

緊縮政策不僅因供應(yīng)方的渠道而產(chǎn)生巨大的福利成本，同樣也傷害了需求，從而惡化就業(yè)。財政整合可以是擴(kuò)張性（即提高產(chǎn)出和就業(yè)）的，某種程度上是通過提高私營部門的信心和投資來實現(xiàn)的。這一觀點在學(xué)術(shù)界被哈佛大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家阿爾貝托·阿萊西以及其他人所認(rèn)同，在政策領(lǐng)域，則被前歐洲央行（ECB）主席Jean-Claude Trichet認(rèn)同，然而，在實踐中，財政整合的意外也隨之而來，這通常是產(chǎn)量降低而非擴(kuò)張。一般而言，1％GDP的合并增加了0.6個百分點的長期失業(yè)率，并且，用來檢測收入不平等的基尼系數(shù)在五年內(nèi)提高了1.5％（鮑爾等人，2013年）。

總之，一些政策的好處似乎已經(jīng)有所夸大，這些政策正是新自由主義議程的一個重要組成部分。在資本開放的情況下，部分資本流動，例如外國直接投資，似乎的確能帶來他們所聲稱的好處。但對于其他人，尤其是短期資本流動，對經(jīng)濟(jì)增長沒什么好處，而在出現(xiàn)較大動蕩和增加危機(jī)風(fēng)險方面，這些政策似乎使得情況迫在眉睫。

在財政整合時，較低的產(chǎn)能和福利以及高失業(yè)率方面的短期成本已經(jīng)被淡化。而一個財政空間充足的國家，面對高負(fù)債時，對于允許通過經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展從而有機(jī)地降低負(fù)債率的愿望，總是不得實現(xiàn)。

An adverse loop-

Moreover, since both openness and austerity are associated withincreasing income inequality, this distributional effect sets up an adversefeedback loop. The increase in inequality engendered by financial openness andausterity might itself undercut growth, the very thing that the neoliberalagenda is intent on boosting. There is now strong evidence that inequality cansignificantly lower both the level and the durability of growth (Ostry, Berg,and Tsangarides, 2014).

一個怪圈

此外，因為開放和緊縮政策都與收入增長的不平等有關(guān)，這種分配效應(yīng)設(shè)置了一個不利的循環(huán)。資本開放造成不公平的加劇，資本緊縮本身又可能削弱經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，恰好，新自由主義議程的意圖就是刺激增長。而有力的證據(jù)表明不公平會顯著降低經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的水平和持續(xù)性（Ostry，Berg和Tsangarides，2014年）。

The evidence of the economic damage from inequality suggests thatpolicymakers should be more open to redistribution than they are. Of course,apart from redistribution, policies could be designed to mitigate some of theimpacts in advance—for instance,through increased spending on education and training, which expands equality ofopportunity (so-called predistribution policies).    And fiscal consolidation strategies—when they are needed—could bedesigned to minimize the adverse impact on low-income groups. But in somecases, the untoward distributional consequences will have to be remedied after they occur by using taxes and governmentspending to redistribute income. Fortunately, the fear that such policies willthemselves necessarily hurt growth is unfounded (Ostry, 2014).-

由不公平所造成的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失的表明，政策制定者應(yīng)該更加注重再分配。當(dāng)然，除了再分配，可以預(yù)先制定一些旨在緩和沖擊的政策——例如，通過增加教育和培訓(xùn)的支出，擴(kuò)大機(jī)會的平等（所謂的預(yù)分配政策）。而必要時，財政整合策略可以被用來盡量減少對低收入群體帶來的不利影響。但在某些情況下，利用稅收和政府支出對收入進(jìn)行再分配后，一些再分配的意外結(jié)果必須得到糾正。幸好，擔(dān)心這樣的政策將必然損害經(jīng)濟(jì)增長是杞人憂天。（奧斯特里，2014年）。

Finding the balance

These findings suggest a need for a more nuanced view of what theneoliberal agenda is likely to be able to achieve. The IMF, which oversees theinternational monetary system, has been at the forefront of thisreconsideration.

尋找平衡

這些發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，對于新自由主義議程的更細(xì)致觀點的呼喚應(yīng)該能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)。負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)督國際貨幣體系的國際貨幣基金組織（IMF），早已對重新審議做出了行動。

例如，IMF的前首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家奧利維爾·布蘭查德在2010年說：“許多先進(jìn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體需要一個可信的中期財政整合，而不是像今天一樣的財政束縛?！比旰螅琁MF理事克里斯蒂娜·拉加德說，說我們相信美國國會提出上升該國的債務(wù)上限是正確的，“因為目前的重點不是通過野蠻地大幅削減支出來約束經(jīng)濟(jì)，因為目前的經(jīng)濟(jì)開始復(fù)蘇?！?015年，IMF建議在歐元區(qū)的各國“財政空間應(yīng)該用來支持投資?！?

On capital account liberalization, the IMF’s view has also changed—from one that considered capital controls as almost alwayscounterproductive to greater acceptance of controlstodeal with the volatility of capital flows. The IMF also recognizes that fullcapital flow liberalization is not always an appropriate end-goal, and thatfurther liberalization is more beneficial and less risky if countries havereached certain thresholds of financial and institutional development.

在資本賬戶自由化方面，IMF的看法也發(fā)生了變化——他們原本認(rèn)為資本管控幾乎總是適得其反，如今卻在更大程度上接受了它，以應(yīng)對資本流動的動蕩。 IMF還認(rèn)識到，全面資本流動自由化并不總是一個合適的最終目標(biāo)，如果國家已達(dá)到財政和機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)展的特定閾值，進(jìn)一步自由化更為有利且風(fēng)險更低。

智利的新自由主義的開拓經(jīng)驗得到了諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎得主弗里德曼的高度贊揚，但現(xiàn)在很多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都向更為細(xì)致的觀點轉(zhuǎn)變。這些觀點來自美國哥倫比亞大學(xué)教授約瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（也是個諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎得主）。智利“是市場結(jié)合適當(dāng)監(jiān)管的一個成功的例子“（2002年）。斯蒂格利茨指出，在早年轉(zhuǎn)向新自由主義期間，智利實行“控制資本的流入，這樣他們就不會被淹沒，”，例如，泰國，第一次亞洲金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)的國家，則是十年半以后才這么干的。智利（現(xiàn)在全國避開資本管制），以及其他國家的經(jīng)驗，表明沒有固定的章程能夠為所有國家的任何時候給予好的結(jié)果。這提醒了政策制定者們和一些機(jī)構(gòu)，如國際貨幣基金組織，制定政策要通過有效的事實證據(jù)，絕不是靠自信。