為全球化中國打造藍(lán)水海軍

如果只是為了解決臺灣和南海問題，中國海軍并不需要這么多艦艇。由于全球貿(mào)易約90%是通過海路運(yùn)輸?shù)?，而中國是世界上最大的貿(mào)易國和最大的原油進(jìn)口國，所以國際海上通道安全對中國來說關(guān)乎命脈。一個(gè)全球化的中國必須擁有自己的藍(lán)水海軍。

這就是為什么自2008年12月以來，中國一直派遣海軍編隊(duì)在非洲之角附近水域巡邏。在中國海軍編隊(duì)護(hù)送的商船中，幾乎有一半是外國船只，說明中國在保護(hù)自身利益的同時(shí)，盡量兼顧國際責(zé)任。在亞丁灣，中國一直在與北約、歐盟和美國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的多國海上力量并肩合作。

中國的目標(biāo)是在2049年慶祝中華人民共和國成立100周年時(shí)建成一支世界一流的軍隊(duì)，這是完全可能的，因?yàn)榻裉斓慕夥跑娨驯辉S多人視為僅次于美軍，而距離目標(biāo)還有20多年的時(shí)間。問題在于，中國會如何使用這支有朝一日可與美國并駕齊驅(qū)的軍事力量？毋庸諱言，一支更強(qiáng)大的中國人民解放軍將更有能力捍衛(wèi)中國主權(quán)。

中國海軍醫(yī)療船“和平方舟”號。來源：中新社

但中國不像美國，沒有傳教士般的干預(yù)他國內(nèi)政或管控世界的狂熱。盡管有猜測中國將建立“珍珠鏈”——橫跨印度洋的一系列海外軍事基地，但迄今為止，中國只于2017年在吉布提建立了一個(gè)后勤保障基地?？梢哉f，中國沒有興趣重蹈美國由于帝國擴(kuò)張致使衰落的老路。

一言蔽之，人們應(yīng)該如何看待中國海軍？

自2010年以來，中國海軍醫(yī)療船“和平方舟”號巡游世界，已為數(shù)十萬人提供了醫(yī)療服務(wù)。這與600年前鄭和下西洋的做法步調(diào)一致，當(dāng)時(shí)鄭和的無敵艦隊(duì)引發(fā)更多的是欽佩，而非望而生畏。

如果說中國最大的驅(qū)逐艦“南昌”號代表了中國的硬實(shí)力，那么“和平方舟”則傳遞了另一面信息：大國的實(shí)力恰恰在于謙遜。

翻譯：中國論壇 蔣紹澄

校譯：中國論壇 韓樺

What's driving China's push to build up its naval power

What best represents China's military strength? The answer: its navy.

At the end of last year, the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy had 360 battle ships, surpassing the United States Navy's 297 vessels. And that gap is expected to widen in the coming years by most estimates.

To paraphrase former Czech president Vaclav Havel, China's naval build-up has happened so rapidly that the world has not had time to be astonished. In the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands between the naval forces of China and South Vietnam, the four Chinese warships combined were dwarfed in size by the largest ship of the South Vietnamese navy.

Unlike the PLA Army, which fought to establish the People's Republic of China, and the PLA Air Force, which fought in the Korean War, the least war-tested PLA Navy now stands at the forefront, simply because today, all threats to China come from the sea.

Be it in the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea, the PLA Navy has to prepare for possible conflict with the US Navy. US President Joe Biden has said that US rivalry with China will take the form of "extreme competition" rather than conflict; the problem is, if competition is already extreme, it is probably like tiptoeing on a tightrope that is only one step away from conflict.

The US is said to maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan. But since the Trump administration, the US government has been salami-slicing away that ambiguity in diverse ways, including enhancing exchanges with Taipei, sending warships to sail provocatively through the Taiwan Strait and deploying its servicemen in Taiwan to help with military training.

It is not surprising then that Beijing is compelled to increase pressure on the island by sending more military aircraft to ?y near Taiwan. In a meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Oct 31, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned the US not to pursue "a fake One China policy".

Should con?ict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, China cannot afford to lose in a war defending its sovereignty. And it probably won't.。

With Taiwan just 160km away from the mainland, the US military will find itself in an asymmetrical disadvantage from the start. It is questionable that its Asian allies will readily allow Americans to use their military bases to turn their homelands into battlefields.。

In the South China Sea, the stronger the PLA Navy becomes, the less likely it will bear with American provocations at China's doorstep on a regular basis.

Unlike in the Cold War where there were clearly defined spheres of influence which allowed the two superpowers to deconflict, there are no buffer zones between the two navies in the South China Sea. Accidents and close calls have occurred, including a deadly collision of two military aircraft in 2001.

The so-called Hainan incident - which led to the death of a Chinese pilot and the detention of the crew of the American reconnaissance plane on the island - was resolved peacefully only after the US ambassador sent a letter in which he said "very sorry" two times.

The situation is far different now. The mutual distrust and lack of strategic consensus between Beijing and Washington leave hardly any room for "common- sense guardrails", in the words of President Biden during his recent virtual meeting with China's President Xi Jinping. De-escalation in a similar crisis will be far more challenging than in the past. The few confidence-building measures in place are only tactical arrangements which can hardly resolve strategic distrust.