去年10月，中美兩國的國防部官員召開了首次危機(jī)溝通工作組會(huì)議，討論危機(jī)的預(yù)防和管控。這次會(huì)議非比尋常，雙方開始討論“危機(jī)”，而不是“意外事件”。這表明，當(dāng)中美關(guān)系直線下降時(shí)，兩軍開始擔(dān)心事態(tài)出現(xiàn)失控。

二十多年來，中美軍事談判經(jīng)常陷入一種最終又回到原點(diǎn)的“彎彎繞”：美方希望進(jìn)行技術(shù)性討論，比如如何避免艦機(jī)發(fā)生近距離的、危險(xiǎn)的相遇；而中方則指出，這些相遇發(fā)生在中國水域，應(yīng)該完全停止。然后，美國人就會(huì)援引他們的航行和飛越自由權(quán)，并要求監(jiān)視美國軍艦的中國軍艦保持安全距離。中國的回應(yīng)？你離得遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)的最安全。

那么，如何才能避免雙方都不想要的沖突呢？答案是：專業(yè)主義。冷戰(zhàn)期間，專業(yè)主義幫助避免了美蘇兩個(gè)死敵間的核戰(zhàn)爭。專業(yè)主義體現(xiàn)在越來越多的信任措施中，包括限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判、《反彈道導(dǎo)彈條約》和《削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》。

中美兩國不是敵人，但降低兩者間的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能比降低美蘇之間的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更具挑戰(zhàn)。

首先，華盛頓和莫斯科之間有明確界定的勢力范圍，這使他們可以避免直接對抗。但是，在北京和華盛頓之間，甚至連個(gè)緩沖區(qū)都沒有。美國海軍艦艇定期在中國南海島礁附近水域和臺(tái)灣海峽航行。

其次，美蘇通過相互確保摧毀來制約彼此，北京和華盛頓的情況卻非如此。中國人民解放軍實(shí)力遠(yuǎn)不如美軍，盡管在西太平洋，這個(gè)差距正在縮小—以至于讓美國覺得一個(gè)越來越自信的中國要把它趕出印太地區(qū)。因此，華盛頓正在加大對該地區(qū)的軍事投入，并呼吁其全球盟友和伙伴成群結(jié)隊(duì)來對付中國。這反過來又惹惱了中國人，使局勢更加動(dòng)蕩。

北京和華盛頓要避免沖突，第一步是遵守已經(jīng)達(dá)成的協(xié)議。最危險(xiǎn)的地方是在海上，海上最關(guān)鍵的是讓艦機(jī)保持安全距離。但是安全距離到底是多少呢？這必須要考慮許多因素，包括能見度、艦船機(jī)動(dòng)性和對其他艦船行動(dòng)意圖的解讀。

雙方不僅要展開對這些因素的嚴(yán)肅討論，還需要定期培訓(xùn)軍人以確保良好的航海技能。兩軍在2014年、2015年和2016年都進(jìn)行了旨在避免海上意外相遇的聯(lián)合演習(xí)，這類演習(xí)應(yīng)該繼續(xù)進(jìn)行，部分原因在于，中國人民解放軍海軍現(xiàn)在更強(qiáng)大了，所以會(huì)更頻繁地與美國海軍在國際海域相遇。

在事件發(fā)生之后，更需要以專業(yè)精神來緩和局勢。例如2001年中美撞機(jī)事件和2018年兩艘軍艦險(xiǎn)些相撞事件。危機(jī)溝通工作組最重要的討論，就是在事件發(fā)生后雙方應(yīng)該做什么，這是以前從未討論過的，可有助于防患于未然。

隨著中美軍事實(shí)力差距縮小，兩國需要在網(wǎng)絡(luò)、人工智能以及太空等新領(lǐng)域討論戰(zhàn)略平衡?，F(xiàn)在很難區(qū)分網(wǎng)絡(luò)事件到底是間諜活動(dòng)還是網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)。但底線是不能攻擊關(guān)鍵信息網(wǎng)絡(luò)，比如軍事指揮和控制系統(tǒng)。2013年，華盛頓和莫斯科在各自的計(jì)算機(jī)應(yīng)急響應(yīng)小組之間建立了聯(lián)系，同意通過核風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低中心(Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre)就網(wǎng)絡(luò)演習(xí)向?qū)Ψ桨l(fā)出警報(bào)，并在白宮和克里姆林宮之間建立了一條直通熱線。

北京和華盛頓也設(shè)有政府和軍隊(duì)層級的熱線。最終，兩國可能會(huì)希望交換一份在任何情況下都不應(yīng)受到攻擊的敏感目標(biāo)清單。

在人工智能領(lǐng)域，如果阻止人工智能武器化的可能性很小，中國和美國可以帶頭建立國際規(guī)范，降低與人工智能軍事系統(tǒng)相關(guān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。鑒于人工智能方興未艾，建立規(guī)范越早越好。

正如布魯金斯學(xué)會(huì)會(huì)長約翰·艾倫所言，一旦人工智能被嵌入軍事系統(tǒng)并開始應(yīng)用，人們就越不情愿削減他們所能建立的任何新能力，尤其是考慮到開發(fā)這種系統(tǒng)的成本有多昂貴。

2011年的《沃爾夫修正案》限制了美國國家航空航天局等美國政府機(jī)構(gòu)與中國商業(yè)或政府機(jī)構(gòu)合作，但無法阻撓中國航天工業(yè)自主創(chuàng)新發(fā)展。中國空間站將于2022年建成，而且在2030年美國的國際空間站報(bào)廢后，將可能是唯一在軌的國際空間站。

美國一直拒絕中國宇航員進(jìn)入其空間站，屆時(shí)會(huì)要求搭中國的便車嗎？北京又會(huì)同意嗎？特朗普在2019年成立美國太空部隊(duì)引發(fā)太空軍備競賽，但是在民用空間探索中，伙伴關(guān)系仍然是首選。既然太空不屬于任何一方，何不聯(lián)合起來進(jìn)行火星探測呢？

冷戰(zhàn)沒有演變?yōu)橐粓鰺釕?zhàn)并不完全是運(yùn)氣使然。盡管存在敵對行動(dòng)，但通過可核查的信任措施，美蘇之間的專業(yè)溝通得以保持并加強(qiáng)。

沒有人知道中美關(guān)系會(huì)如何演進(jìn)，但為了讓競爭對手在新的冷戰(zhàn)中不成為敵人，雙方需要拉一個(gè)長長的信任措施清單。單子越長，戰(zhàn)爭風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越小。

（中國論壇許馨勻譯自《南華早報(bào)》韓樺校譯，翻頁閱讀英文原文）

US and China should learn from the Cold War to avoid an arms race and conflict

Last October, US and Chinese defense officials convened their first Crisis Communications Working Group to discuss crisis prevention and management. The meeting was unusual in discussing “crisis” for the first time, rather than “accidents”. It showed that the two militaries have begun to worry about things getting out of hand when bilateral ties go into free fall.

For over two decades, China-US military discussions have often been in a Catch-22 situation: Americans wanted technical discussions, say, on how to avoid close and dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft, while the Chinese would point out that these encounters in Chinese waters should simply stop.

Americans would then cite their right to freedom of navigation and overflight, and ask Chinese ships monitoring American vessels to keep a safe distance. The Chinese response? You are safest when you stay away.

So, how can they avoid unwanted confrontation? The answer is: professionalism. During the Cold War, professionalism helped to avoid a nuclear fallout between two bitter enemies. This is reflected in the growing list of confidence-building measures that include the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

China and the US are not enemies. But reducing the risks between them could be more challenging than it was for the US and the Soviet Union. First, there were clearly defined spheres of influence between Washington and Moscow, which allowed them to avoid direct confrontation.

But there isn’t even a buffer zone between Beijing and Washington. American naval vessels regularly sail through the waters off Chinese islands and rocks in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Secondly, the US and the Soviet Union were balanced by mutually assured destruction. This is not the situation with Beijing and Washington.

The People’s Liberation Army lags far behind the US military, although in the Western Pacific, the gap is closing – to the extent that the US believes an ever-confident China wants to drive it out of the Indo-Pacific.

Therefore, Washington is investing more militarily in the region and calling on its global allies and partners to gang up on China. This in turn irks the Chinese and makes the situation more volatile.

For Beijing and Washington to avoid conflict, the first step is to observe the agreements already made. The most dangerous place is at sea. The key is for ships and aircrafts to keep a safe distance.

But what exactly is a safe distance? Many factors including visibility, vessel maneuverability and an understanding of the maneuvering intentions of the other vessel have to be considered.

They require not only serious discussions, but also regular training to ensure good seamanship. The two militaries conducted joint drills to avoid unplanned encounters at sea in 2014, 2015 and 2016. Such exercises should continue, in part because a stronger PLA Navy now meets the US Navy more regularly in international waters.

Professionalism is more needed in de-escalating incidents after they occur, such as the deadly collision between two military aircrafts in 2001 and a narrowly avoided collision of two naval vessels in 2018.

The most significant discussion of the Crisis Communications Working Group meeting was what to do after an incident, which had not been discussed before. This might help to prevent incidents from happening in the first place.

As the gap in strengthing between the Chinese and American militaries becomes smaller, both countries need to discuss strategic equilibrium in new areas such as cyber and artificial intelligence, and space. It is difficult to tell whether cyber incidents are espionage or cyberwarfare.

But the bottom line is not to attack critical information networks, such as military command and control systems. In 2013, Washington and Moscow established links between their national computer emergency response teams, agreed to warn each other of cyber exercises through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre and set up a direct hotline between the White House and the Kremlin.

Beijing and Washington also have hotlines at governmental and military levels. Eventually, both countries might wish to exchange a list of sensitive targets that should be forbidden from coming under attack in any circumstances.

In artificial intelligence, if preventing AI from being weaponized is not possible, China and the US could lead in building international norms and reducing risks related to AI-enabled military systems. The sooner this is done, the better, while AI is still a nascent development.

As Brookings Institution president John R. Allen put it, once AI is embedded into military systems and applied, there will be less willingness to roll back any new capabilities they afford, particularly given how costly such systems are to develop.

The 2011 Wolf Amendments limit US government agencies such as Nasa from working with Chinese commercial or governmental agencies, but could not handicap the self-reliant Chinese space industry.

A Chinese space station will be built in 2022, and might be the only space station left in orbit after the International Space Station built by the US comes to the end of its life in 2030.

Will the US, which has refused Chinese astronauts’ entry into its space station, ask China for a ride then? And would Beijing agree?

Donald Trump’s establishment of the US Space Force in 2019 has ushered in an arms race in space. But in civil space exploration, partnerships are still preferable. Since space belongs to no one, why not make the exploration of Mars a joint effort?

That the Cold War did not become a hot war was not down to sheer luck. In spite of hostilities, professional communications were maintained and strengthened through verifiable confidence-building measures.

No one knows how the China-US relationship might evolve, but for competitors to not become enemies in a new cold war, they need a long list of confidence-building measures. The longer the list, the smaller the risk of war.

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret) is a senior fellow of Center for International Security and Strategy Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert