【按】：2013年TED環(huán)球大會(huì)在愛丁堡舉行。6月13日，上海的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家和政治學(xué)學(xué)者，春秋研究院研究員、中歐國際工商學(xué)院校董李世默在大會(huì)上發(fā)表演講，題目為China and the End of Meta-Narratives，以親身經(jīng)歷講述中國發(fā)展的兩個(gè)三十年故事，突破了以往TED演講題材，涉及中國崛起的歷史、制度、經(jīng)驗(yàn)等方方面面，引起現(xiàn)場熱烈反響。觀察者網(wǎng)編輯列席大會(huì)，下面是演講全文，摘要已刊發(fā)于今日的《環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)》：

我出生在“文化大革命”高潮時(shí)的上海。

外婆后來告訴我，她當(dāng)時(shí)抱著襁褓之中啼哭不止的我，心驚膽戰(zhàn)地聽著“武斗”的槍聲。

在我少年時(shí)，我被灌輸了一個(gè)關(guān)于人類社會(huì)發(fā)展規(guī)律的大故事，這個(gè)“元敘事”是這樣說的：

所有的人類社會(huì)都遵循一個(gè)線性的目標(biāo)明確的發(fā)展規(guī)律，即從原始社會(huì)開始，經(jīng)由奴隸社會(huì)、封建社會(huì)、資本主義社會(huì)、社會(huì)主義社會(huì)，最終過渡到（猜猜這個(gè)終點(diǎn)？）共產(chǎn)主義社會(huì)。共產(chǎn)主義社會(huì)是人類政治、社會(huì)發(fā)展的最高階段，所有的人類社會(huì)，不管民族、文化、語言有何異同，或早或晚都將演進(jìn)到這一階段。人類社會(huì)自此大同，彼此相親相愛，永遠(yuǎn)過著幸福的生活——人間天堂。但在實(shí)現(xiàn)這樣目標(biāo)之前，我們必須投身于正義與邪惡的斗爭，即正義的社會(huì)主義與邪惡的資本主義之間的斗爭，正義終將勝利！

當(dāng)然，這就是從馬克思主義發(fā)展而來的社會(huì)發(fā)展階段論，這一“元敘事”在中國影響甚廣。

我們從小就被反復(fù)灌輸了這個(gè)宏大故事，幾乎融化到了血液之中，篤信不疑。

這個(gè)“元敘事”不僅征服了中國，也影響了全世界。世界上曾經(jīng)有整整三分之一人在它籠罩之下。

然而，忽然一夜之間，蘇聯(lián)崩潰，世界滄桑巨變。

我赴美留學(xué)，改宗成為伯克利的嬉皮士，哈哈！

就這樣，開啟了我另一段成年經(jīng)歷，我又被灌輸了一個(gè)全新的宏大敘事，仿佛我這輩子只經(jīng)歷那一個(gè)還不夠似的。這個(gè)宏大敘事的完美程度與早前的那一個(gè)不分伯仲。它同樣宣稱，人類社會(huì)遵循著一個(gè)線性的發(fā)展規(guī)律，指向一個(gè)終極目標(biāo)。敘事故事是這樣展開的：

所有的人類社會(huì)，不論其文化有何異同，其民眾是基督徒、穆斯林還是儒家信徒，都將從傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)過渡到現(xiàn)代社會(huì)。在傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)中，最基本的社會(huì)單位是家庭、氏族、部落等群體；而在現(xiàn)代社會(huì)中，最基本的、神圣不可侵犯的社會(huì)單位是原子化的個(gè)人。所有的個(gè)人都被認(rèn)定為是理性的，都有同一個(gè)訴求：選舉權(quán)！

因?yàn)槊恳粋€(gè)個(gè)人都是理性的，一旦有了權(quán)選舉，必然會(huì)選出好政府，隨后就可以在好政府的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，過上幸福的生活，相當(dāng)于實(shí)現(xiàn)大同社會(huì)——又是一個(gè)人間天堂。選舉民主制將成為所有國家和民族唯一的政治制度，再加上一個(gè)自由放任的市場讓他們發(fā)財(cái)。當(dāng)然，在實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)之前，我們必須投身于正義與邪惡的斗爭，即正義的民主與邪惡的不民主之間的斗爭。前者肩負(fù)著在全世界推動(dòng)民主的使命，必要時(shí)甚至可以動(dòng)用武力，來打擊那些不投票不選舉的邪惡勢力。

上述宏大敘事同樣傳播甚廣。根據(jù)“自由之家”的統(tǒng)計(jì)，全世界采用選舉民主制的國家，從1970年的45個(gè)已增至2010年的115個(gè)。近20多年來，西方的精英人士孜孜不倦地在全世界奔走，推薦選舉民主這一救世良方。他們聲稱，實(shí)行多黨選舉是拯救發(fā)展中國家于水火的唯一良藥，只要吃下它，就一定會(huì)實(shí)現(xiàn)繁榮，否則，永無翻身之日。

但這一次，中國敬謝不敏。

歷史是最好的裁判。僅僅30多年間，中國就從世界上最貧困的農(nóng)業(yè)國，一躍而為世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，實(shí)現(xiàn)6.5億人脫貧。實(shí)際上，這期間全世界80%的減貧任務(wù)是由中國完成的。也就是說，如果沒有中國的成績，全世界的減貧成就不值一提。所有老的、新的民主國家的脫貧人口加起來，都不及中國一個(gè)零頭。而取得這些成績的中國，沒有實(shí)行他們所謂的選舉，也沒有實(shí)行多黨制。

所以，我禁不住問自己，我眼前畫面到底哪里不對勁兒？我的故鄉(xiāng)上海，一切都已今非昔比，新生企業(yè)如雨后春筍般發(fā)展起來，中產(chǎn)階級以史無前例的速度和規(guī)模在增長。但根據(jù)西方的那個(gè)宏大敘事，這一切繁榮景象本不應(yīng)該出現(xiàn)。

面對這一切，我開始做我唯一可以做的事，即思考它！

中國的確是個(gè)一黨制的國家，由中國共產(chǎn)黨長期執(zhí)政，不實(shí)行西方意義上的選舉。按照當(dāng)代主流的政治理論，人們據(jù)此可以生成三個(gè)判斷，即這個(gè)體制一定是僵化的、封閉的、不具合法性的。

但這些論斷被證明是完全錯(cuò)誤的。事實(shí)恰恰相反，中國的一黨制具有與時(shí)俱進(jìn)的能力、選賢任能的體制、深植于民心的政權(quán)合法性，這些是確保其成功的核心要素。

李世默在2013年TED環(huán)球大會(huì)發(fā)表演講

大多數(shù)政治學(xué)家斷言，一黨制天生缺乏自我糾錯(cuò)能力，因此很難持久。

但歷史實(shí)踐卻證明這一斷言過于自信。中共已經(jīng)在中國這個(gè)世界上最大的國家之一連續(xù)執(zhí)政64年，其政策調(diào)整的幅度超過近代任何國家。從激進(jìn)的土改到“大躍進(jìn)”運(yùn)動(dòng)，再到土地“準(zhǔn)私有化”；從“文化大革命”到鄧小平的市場化改革。鄧小平的繼任者江澤民更進(jìn)一步，主動(dòng)吸納包括民營企業(yè)家在內(nèi)的新社會(huì)階層人士入黨，而這在毛的時(shí)代是不可想象的。事實(shí)證明，中共具有超凡的與時(shí)俱進(jìn)和自我糾錯(cuò)能力。

過去實(shí)行的一些不再有效的制度也不斷得到糾正和更新。比如，政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的任期制，毛時(shí)期，政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人實(shí)際上是終身任職的。這容易導(dǎo)致大權(quán)獨(dú)攬、不受制約等問題。毛澤東作為現(xiàn)代中國的締造者，在位晚年也未能避免犯下類似的嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)誤。隨后，中共逐步實(shí)施了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的任期制，并將任職的年齡上限確定為68到70歲。

最近很多人聲稱，相比于經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，中國的政治改革嚴(yán)重滯后，因此當(dāng)前亟需在政改中取得突破。這一論斷實(shí)際上是隱藏著政治偏見的話語陷阱，這個(gè)話語陷阱預(yù)設(shè)了哪些變革才算所謂的政治改革，只有實(shí)行這些特定的變革才行。事實(shí)上，中國的政治改革從未停滯。與三十年、二十年，甚至十年前相比，中國從基層到高層，從社會(huì)各領(lǐng)域到國家治理方式上，都發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化。如果沒有根本性的政治改革，這一切變化都是不可能的。

我甚至想大膽地判斷說，中共是世界第一流的政治改革專家。

西方主流的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，一黨制意味著政治上封閉，一小撮人把持了權(quán)力，必然導(dǎo)致劣政和腐敗。

的確，腐敗是一個(gè)大問題。不過，讓我們先打開視野看一下全景。說起來可能令人難以置信，中共內(nèi)部選賢任能競爭之激烈程度，可能超過世界上所有的政治組織。

十八大前，中共的最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)——中央政治局共有25名委員，其中只有5人出身背景優(yōu)越，也就是所謂的“太子黨”。其余20人，包括國家主席胡錦濤和政府總理溫家寶，都是平民出身。再看300多人組成的十七屆中央委員會(huì)，出身顯赫者的比例更低?？梢哉f，絕大多數(shù)中共高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都是靠自身努力和激烈競爭獲得晉升的。與其他發(fā)達(dá)國家和發(fā)展中國家統(tǒng)治精英的出身相比，我們必須承認(rèn)中共內(nèi)部平民出身的干部享有廣闊的晉升空間。

中共如何在一黨制的基礎(chǔ)上保證選賢任能呢？關(guān)鍵之一是有一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的組織機(jī)構(gòu)，即組織部。對此西方鮮有人知。這套機(jī)制選賢任能的效力，恐怕最成功的商業(yè)公司都會(huì)自嘆弗如。

它像一個(gè)旋轉(zhuǎn)的金字塔，有三個(gè)部位組合而成。

中國的公務(wù)人員分為三類：即政府職能部門、國有企業(yè)，以及政府管轄的事業(yè)單位，如大學(xué)、社區(qū)組織等。公務(wù)人員既可以在某一類部門中長期工作，也可以在三類中交替任職。政府以及相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)一年一度地從大學(xué)畢業(yè)生中招錄人員，大部分新人會(huì)從最低一級的科員干起。組織部門會(huì)根據(jù)其表現(xiàn)，決定是否將其提升到更高的管理職位上，比如副科、科、副處、處。這可不是電影《龍威小子》中的動(dòng)作名稱，而是嚴(yán)肅的人事工作。

這一區(qū)間的職位包羅萬象，既可以負(fù)責(zé)貧困農(nóng)村的衛(wèi)生工作，也可能負(fù)責(zé)城區(qū)里的招商引資，也可能是一家公司的基層經(jīng)理。各級干部每年都要接受組織部門的考察，其中包括征求上級、下級和同事的反饋意見，以及個(gè)人操守審查，此外還有民意調(diào)查，最終擇優(yōu)提職。

在整個(gè)職業(yè)生涯中，中共的干部可以在政府職能部門、企業(yè)，以及社會(huì)事業(yè)單位等三大領(lǐng)域內(nèi)輪轉(zhuǎn)任職。在基層表現(xiàn)優(yōu)秀的佼佼者可以晉升為副局和正局級干部，進(jìn)入高級干部行列。這一級別的干部，有可能領(lǐng)導(dǎo)數(shù)百萬人口的城區(qū)，也有可能管理年?duì)I業(yè)收入數(shù)億美元的企業(yè)。從統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)就可以看出選拔局級干部的競爭有多激烈，2012年，中國科級與副科級干部約為90萬人，處級與副處級干部約為60萬人，而局級與副局級干部僅為4萬人。

在局級干部中，只有最為出眾的極少數(shù)人才有機(jī)會(huì)繼續(xù)晉升，最終進(jìn)入中共中央委員會(huì)。就職業(yè)生涯來看，一位干部要晉升到高層，期間一般要經(jīng)過二三十年的工作歷練。這過程中有任人唯親的問題嗎，當(dāng)然有。但從根本上，干部是否德才兼?zhèn)洳攀翘岚蔚臎Q定性因素。事實(shí)上，中華帝國的官僚體系有著千年歷史，今天中共的組織部門創(chuàng)造性地繼承了這一獨(dú)特的歷史遺產(chǎn)，并發(fā)展成現(xiàn)代化的制度以培養(yǎng)當(dāng)代中國的政治精英。

習(xí)近平的履歷就是非常鮮明的例證。習(xí)的父親確實(shí)是中共的一位前領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，但他的仕途也歷經(jīng)了30年之久。習(xí)近平從村干部做起，一步一個(gè)腳印的走到今天這個(gè)崗位。在他進(jìn)入中央政治局之前，他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)過的地區(qū)總?cè)丝诶塾?jì)已超過1.5億，創(chuàng)造的GDP合計(jì)超過1.5萬億美元。

千萬不要誤解，這不是針對具體的人，僅僅是事實(shí)的陳述。如果要論政府管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)，小布什在任德州州長前和奧巴馬第一次問鼎美國總統(tǒng)時(shí)，他們資歷還比不上中國一個(gè)小縣長。

溫斯頓·丘吉爾曾說：“民主是個(gè)壞制度，但其他制度更壞”?？上В麤]有見識過組織部。

西方人總認(rèn)為多黨競選和普選是合法性的唯一來源。曾有人問我：“中共不經(jīng)選舉執(zhí)政，其合法性從何而來？”我的回答是：“舍我其誰的執(zhí)政能力。”

我們都知道歷史，1949年中共執(zhí)政時(shí)，由于戰(zhàn)火肆虐，外敵橫行，中國的國土四分五裂，滿目瘡痍；中國人的人均壽命僅為41歲。但在今天，中國已躋身世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，成為在全球有重要影響的大國，人民生活迅速改善，人均壽命排名奇跡般地列中等發(fā)達(dá)國家前茅。

根據(jù)皮尤研究中心在中國的民意調(diào)查報(bào)告，其中一些數(shù)據(jù)反映了中國的主流民意，其中大部分?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)在近幾十年來十分穩(wěn)定。

高達(dá)85%的中國民眾，對國家未來方向表示滿意；70%的民眾認(rèn)為在過去的五年生活得到改善；82%的民眾對未來五年頗感樂觀。

英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》剛剛公布的全球青年人民調(diào)結(jié)果顯示：93%的中國90后年輕人對國家的未來感到樂觀。

如果這不是合法性，那我就不知道到底什么才是合法性了。

相比之下，全世界大部分選舉民主制國家都處于慘淡經(jīng)營的境況。關(guān)于美國和歐洲的政治困境，在座的聽眾都了然于胸，無需我再詳述。除了極少數(shù)例外，大部分采用選舉的發(fā)展中國家，迄今為止還在遭受貧困和戰(zhàn)火的折磨。政府通過選舉上臺(tái)后，其支持率在幾個(gè)月內(nèi)就會(huì)跌到50%以下，從此一蹶不振甚至持續(xù)走低，直到下一次選舉?？梢哉f，民主已經(jīng)陷入“一次選舉，長期后悔”的周期性怪圈。這樣下去，失去合法性的恐怕不是中國的一黨制，而是選舉民主制。

當(dāng)然，我不想造成一種誤會(huì)，認(rèn)為中國成為超級大國已經(jīng)指日可待了。中國當(dāng)前面臨重大挑戰(zhàn)，巨大變遷帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)問題數(shù)不勝數(shù)，譬如環(huán)境污染， 食品安全、人口問題。在政治領(lǐng)域，最大的挑戰(zhàn)是腐敗。

目前，腐敗猖獗，危及中國的政治制度及其道德合法性。但是，很多分析人士誤判了腐敗的原因，他們聲稱腐敗是一黨制導(dǎo)致的，只有終結(jié)一黨制才能根絕腐敗。更嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)一點(diǎn)兒的分析將證明這種觀點(diǎn)毫無根據(jù)。

據(jù)透明國際發(fā)布的全球清廉指數(shù)排名，中國近年來的排名在第70到80名之間。印度是世界上人口最多的選舉民主制國家，排名第95位，且逐年下滑；希臘排名第80位；印度尼西亞與阿根廷排名并列第100位；菲律賓排名第129位。排名在中國后的約100個(gè)國家中，超過一半是選舉民主制國家。如果選舉是根治腐敗的萬靈藥，為何在這么多國家不靈呢？

我是做風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的，長于預(yù)測。因此，不做幾個(gè)預(yù)測就結(jié)束今天的討論似乎不妥。以下是我的三個(gè)預(yù)測：

未來十年：

1. 中國將超過美國成為世界第一大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，按人均收入計(jì)算也將在發(fā)展中國家里名列前茅。2. 腐敗雖然無法根絕，但將得到有效控制。在透明國際的全球清廉指數(shù)排行榜上，中國有望繼續(xù)提升10到20名，跨入全球最清廉的前60國之列。3. 經(jīng)濟(jì)改革會(huì)加速實(shí)施，政治改革也將繼續(xù)推進(jìn)，中共仍穩(wěn)固執(zhí)政。

我們正在見證一個(gè)時(shí)代的落幕。共產(chǎn)主義和選舉民主制，都是基于普世價(jià)值的“元敘事”。在20世紀(jì)，我們見證了前者因極端教條而失??；到21世紀(jì)，后者正重蹈同樣的覆轍。“元敘事”就像癌癥一樣，正在從內(nèi)部吞噬民主。我想澄清一下，我并不是要譴責(zé)民主。相反，我認(rèn)為民主政治對西方的崛起和現(xiàn)代世界的誕生居功至偉。然而，很多西方精英把某一種民主形式模式化、普世化，這是西方當(dāng)前各種病癥的病灶所在。如果西方的精英不是將大把的時(shí)間花在向外國推銷民主上，而是更多關(guān)心一下自身的政治改革，恐怕民主還不至于像今天這樣無望。

中國的政治模式不可能取代選舉民主，因?yàn)橹袊鴱牟粚⒆约旱恼沃贫劝b成普世通用的模式，也不熱衷于對外輸出。進(jìn)一步說，中國模式的重要意義，不在于為世界各國提供了一個(gè)可以替代選舉民主的新模式，而在于從實(shí)踐上證明了良政的模式不是單一而是多元的，各國都有可能找到適合本國的政治制度。

讓我們?yōu)?ldquo;元敘事”的時(shí)代畫個(gè)句號吧。共產(chǎn)主義和民主可能都是人類最美好的追求，但它們普世化的教條時(shí)代已經(jīng)過去。我們的下一代，不需要被灌輸說，世界上只有一種政治模式，所有社會(huì)都只有一種歸宿。這是錯(cuò)誤的，不負(fù)責(zé)任的，也是乏味的。多元化正在取代普世化。一個(gè)更精彩的時(shí)代正緩緩拉開帷幕，我們有沒有勇氣擁抱它呢？

以下為演講的英文全文：

CHINA AND THE END OF META-NARRATIVES

TED GLOBAL 2013

ERIC X. LI

I was born in Shanghai at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard gunfire along with my first cries.

When I was growing up, I was taught a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity. It went like this:

All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, going through slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, (guess where we end up?) Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of nationality, culture, language, will reach that final stage of political and social development. The entire world’s peoples will be unified in this paradise on earth and live happily ever after. But, before we get there, we are engaged in a struggle between good and evil: the good of socialism and the evil of capitalism. And the good shall triumph!

That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it.

We were told that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us and we believed in it.

The story was a best seller. A full one-third of the world’s population was living under that meta-narrative.

Then, the world changed, overnight.

As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America – became a hippie in Berkeley.

As I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn’t enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all societies must develop along linear progression towards a singular end. It goes as follows:

All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups were the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units. All these individuals are by definition rational, and they all want one thing – the vote!

Because they are all rational, once given the vote they produce good government and live happily ever after – paradise on earth. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. Before we get there, however, we are engaged in a struggle of good against evil. Good belongs to those who are democracies charged with the mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections.

This story also became a best seller. According to the Freedom House, the number of countries practicing electoral democracy grew from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe, selling this prospectus – multiple political parties fight for power with everyone voting on them - as the only path to salvation for the long suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success and those who do not are doomed to fail.

But this time, the Chinese didn’t buy it. Fool me once …

The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries to the world’s second largest economy. 650 million people were lifted out of poverty. A full 80% of the world’s poverty alleviation during this period happened in China. In other words, without China’s numbers, the world’s poverty reduction would have been almost flat. Apparently, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a fraction of what a single one-party state did – without voting.

See, I grew up on these things – food stamps. In Shanghai, meat was rationed to 300 grams per person per month. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother’s portions.

So, I ask myself, what’s wrong with this picture? Here I am, in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds, entrepreneurs are starting companies every day, middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story none of this should be happening.

So I went and did the only thing I could, I studied it.

China is a one-party state – run by the Chinese Communist Party – the Party; and they don’t hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theory of our time: Such a system must be operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate.

These assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system.

Adaptability

Most political scientists would tell you that a system monopolized by a single party is by definition incapable of self-correction. It can’t survive long because it can’t adapt.

Here are the facts: During its 64 years running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party’s policies was broader than any country in recent history. Radical land collectivization and the Great Leap Foreward, then the quasi-privatization of farmland. The Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople – something unimaginable during Mao’s rule. The Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions.

Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain positions for life. They accumulated power and perpetuated their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule also led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 – 70.

One thing we often hear is that political reform has lagged behind economic reform and China is in dire need of political reforms. But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. Some have decided a priori what changes they want to see and only such changes can be called political reform. But political reforms have never stopped. Compared with ten years ago, twenty years ago, and thirty years ago, just about every aspect of Chinese society and how the country is governed, from the most local to the highest center, are unrecognizable. Such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind.

I would venture to suggest that the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform.

The second assumption: one-party rule leads to a closed political system in which power gets concentrated in the hands of the few. Bad governance and corruption are the results.

Yes, corruption is a big problem. But let’s first look at the larger context. It might be counter intuitive to you, but the Party is one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world.

China’s highest ruling body is the Politburo. It usually has 25 members. In the most recent Politburo only five came from privileged backgrounds (the so-called princelings). The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from completely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger Central Committee of over 300, the percentage born into wealth and power was even smaller. The vast majority of senior officials worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that to the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you would find the Party ranks near the top in upward mobility.

The question then is how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful institution little known to Westerners – the Party’s Organization Department. The Department functions like a human resource engine that would be the envy of even the most successful corporations.

It operates a rotating pyramid.

Made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations such a university or a community program. They form separate and yet integrated career tracks for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in one of these tracks. They start at the lowest level, called ke yuan. Periodically, the Organization Department reviews their performance and can promote them up through four increasingly elite ranks: fu ke, ke, fu chu, and chu. These are not moves from Karate Kids. It’s serious business.

The range of positions is wide, from running health-care in a village to foreign investment in a city to manager in a company. Once a year, the Organization Department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, peers, and subordinates, vet their personal conducts, conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote winners.

Throughout their careers, these cadres could rotate through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base-level grades to the fu ju and ju levels. There they enter high officialdom. At that point a typical assignment is to manage districts with populations in the millions or companies with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. To show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fu ke and ke levels, 600,000 fu chu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fu ju and ju levels.

After the Ju level, the best few move up several more ranks and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The entire process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But by and large, merit is the underlying driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China’s centuries old Mandarin system.

China’s new president Xi Jinping in son of a former Chinese senior official – very unusual, the first of his kind to get the top job. Even for him the career path took 30 years. He started as a village manager and when he entered the Politburo he had managed areas with total populations of over 150 million and combined GDPS of more than US$1.5 trillion.

Please don’t get me wrong. This is not a put-down of anyone but merely a statement of fact. George W. Bush before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for president, would not make a small county chief in China’s system.

Winston Churchill once said, “Democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest”. Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department.

Legitimacy

Westerners assume that multiparty election with universal suffrage is the only source of legitimacy. I was asked once, “the Party was not voted in by election, where is its source of legitimacy?” I said, “how about competency?”

We know the facts: In 1949 when the Party took over, China was mired in civil wars and dismembered by foreign aggressions; average life expectancy was 41. Today, it is the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity.

Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes. These are the numbers in recent years, and they have been largely consistent in the last couple of decades:

Satisfaction with the general direction of the country – 85% Those who report significant progress in their lives in the past five years – 70% Those who expect the future to be better – a whopping 82%

Financial Times survey of global youth attitudes just released:

93% of China’s generation-Y are optimistic about their country’s future!

If this is not legitimacy, I’m not sure what is.

In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don’t need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is from America to Europe. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries who adopted electoral regimes are still mired in poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected and then fall below 50% approval a few months later and stay there or get worse till the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of “elect and regret”. At this rate, I’m afraid democracy itself, not China’s one-party system, is in danger of losing legitimacy.

Now, I don’t want to create the misimpression that China is hunky dory on way to superpower-dom. China is not a superpower and probably will never be one. The country faces enormous challenges. Economic and social problems that come with such drastic changes are mind-boggling: pollution, food safety, population issues. On the political front, the biggest challenge is corruption.

Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most commentators misdiagnose the disease. They say corruption is a result of the one-party system and to cure it you have to do away with the entire system. A more careful look would tell us otherwise.

According to Transparency International, China ranks in recent years between 70 and 80 among some 170 countries and has been gradually moving up. India, the largest electoral democracy in the world, 95 and has been dropping. More than half of the 100 countries below China are electoral democracies. If election is the panacea for corruption how come these countries can’t fix it?

I’m a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn’t be proper to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions.

In the next ten years:

1. China will surpass the US and become the largest economy in the world; Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries.

2. Corruption will be curbed, not eliminated, and China will move up 10 – 20 notches to above 60 in TI ranking.

3. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm.

We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from inside. Let me clarify one thing: I am not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim many Western elites are making about their political system – the hubris – that is at the heart of the West’s current ills. Perhaps, if they spend a little less time forcing their ways onto others and a little more on political reform at home, they can give their own democracy a better chance.

China’s political model will never supplant electoral democracy because, unlike the latter, it does not pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China’s example is not that it provides an alternative but the demonstration that alternatives exist.

Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals. But the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people, and our children, there is only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong, it is irresponsible, and worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps, a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it?

END